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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF SECRECY: WHY PATENT LAW
PREEMPTS REVERSE-ENGINEERING CLAUSES IN SHRINK-
WRAP LICENSES
As the world enters the twenty-first century, the U.S. economy is
becoming increasingly driven by the value of ideas.' The United
States has experienced a sharp increase during the past decade in
the number2 and value of patents filed,' primarily as a response to
the rapid growth of high technology industry. In fact, the
"competitive battles once fought for control of markets and raw
materials are now increasingly being waged over the exclusive
rights to new ideas and inventions. " "
This growth and competition has created new legal challenges for
America's intellectual property (IP) system.5 One important
challenge to this system is the proliferation of avoidance techniques
threatening the underlying policies behind federal copyright and
patent laws. One technique increasingly being employed is the use
of "shrink-wrap" licenses in an attempt to contract around the
policies behind IP law.6
The policy behind federal patent law-allowing limited
exclusivity in exchange for long-term contribution to the public
domain-runs counter to some of the clauses contained in these
license agreements. When courts uphold these agreements under
state contract law they are expanding the degree of exclusivity
1. KEVIN G. RvBEum & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATIc: UNLOCKING THE
HIDDENVALUE OF PATENTS 2 (2000).
2. See id. at 15.
3. See id. at 6.
4. Id. at 2-3.
5. See id. at 19-21 (discussing the relatively recent problem of Internet "trash" patents
and "kitchen sink" patents-patents asserting overt asset claims).
6. Shrink-wrap licenses are found most often on computer software. Prior to opening
the shrink-wrap covering on computer software disks, users must agree to the terms of a
specific license agreement. Common clauses in these agreements require the purchaser to
refrain from certain actions, such as copying programs. This Note demonstrates that some
of these contract clauses run counter to the policies behind federal patent law. See infra notes
136-47 and accompanying text. The issue then becomes whether such licenses are valid in
light of this conflict.
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enjoyed by patent holders. Therefore, a conflict arises between
federal patent law and state contract law over exactly how rights
are to be held.7 It is well settled that when federal and state law
directly conflict, the doctrine of preemption holds that the state law
is subordinate to the goals of the federal government! Patent law
should thus preempt the portions of these license agreements that
run counter to the federal policy. This Note asserts that patent law
preempts specific clauses of shrink-wrap licenses, primarily those
restricting reverse-engineering, decompilation, and disassembly of
a particular item, and should continue to do so, barring a change to
current patent law.
The policy behind granting patent holders the right to exclude in
exchange for public disclosure of their inventions is the promotion
of the continued development of technology.9 Some limited
7. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the
validity of license agreements using a state contract law theory over copyright preemption).
At least one court has looked at the shrink-wrap licenses of software through the lens of the
patent law and has found such licenses to be preempted. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
8. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution specifically states that laws made pursuant to constitutional authority are the
"supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Courts have interpreted this clause
countless times to stand for the proposition that when state and federal law and policy
directly conflict, the state law is considered invalid. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1,210 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,406 (1819); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 339 (1816).
9. See ROBERT PATRICKMERGES, PATENTLAWAND POLICY: CASES ANDMATERIALS 13 (2d
ed. 1997). The current patent law grants the right to exclude all others from using the
invention for a period of twenty years from the date of the filing of the patent. 35 U.S.C. §
154 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). This right to exclude is not the same as a monopoly right. In fact,
it is tantamount to sacrilege to term a patent a monopoly. Justice Roberts discussed the
reasoning behind this:
Though often so characterized, apatentis not, accurately speaking, a monopoly,
for it is not created by the executive authority at the expense and to the
prejudice of all the community except the grantee of the patent. The term
monopoly connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling,
working or using a thing which the public freely enjoyed prior to the grant.
Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An inventor deprives the
public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of
value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.
United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (citation omitted). The
inventor is giving value in exchange for his right to exclude. His rights, therefore, cannot be
deemed a monopoly. For an excellent historical discussion of monopoly versus the right-to-
exclude definition of patents, see 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LiPscomB III, LIPscOMB's WALIHR
ON PATENTS § 1:6, 34-49 (3d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1999).
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contravention of the policy is acceptable. For example, trade secret
law runs contrary to this policy but is acceptable because it does not
restrict valid reverse engineering0 ofunpatentable subject matter. "
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that valid reverse engineering
that reveals trade secrets negates any protection of unpatentable
subject matter once the secret becomes public. 2 To allow state
contract law, through the mechanism of shrink-wrap licenses, to
prevent reverse engineering runs contrary to the policy surrounding
the development of patent law, and would create a slippery slope
that could result in all new inventions being shrouded in shrink-
wrap with a license clause prohibiting reverse engineering. This
secrecy would result in a drastic slowdown in the development of
novel ideas, and would suppress the competitive spirit inherent in
the U.S. economy.
This Note contains three parts. The first section discusses the
historical development of the patent law, including its consti-
tutional basis and the policy behind it at the time of the drafting of
the Constitution. This portion also delineates the development of
patent law from the years following the American Revolution to the
present, and discusses recent overseas developments regarding the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)" agreement
as part of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)'4 talks. 5
10. Reverse engineering has been defined by the Supreme Court to mean "startingwith
the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development ormanufacture." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
160 (1989) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)).
11. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments, Prefatory Note (1985), in
Arnold H. Pedowitz & Robert W. Sikker, Trade-Secrets:A State-by-State Survey, 1997 A.B.A.
SEc. LABOR & EMP. LAw 985.
12. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 159-61.
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUmENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAYROUND vol. 31,33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter Trips Agreement]. For more information on TRIPS and
international patent development, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
14. GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. For more information on GATT, see infra notes 54-58
and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 24-65 and accompanying text.
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The second section of this Note provides an overview of
preemption law, including its historical basis in the Constitution,
its early exposition in landmark cases such as McCulloch v.
Maryland6 and Gibbons v. Ogden, 7 and the current state of
preemption law."8 This section then concentrates onthe preemption
history associated with patent law in particular, including policy
justifications, and reviews the current state of the law in this
area.19
The third section combines the history and policy of the first
section with the preemption development of the second section in
order to examine a standard shrink-wrap license's reverse-
engineering clause.2" The section then analyzes how such a clause
violates the policy behind the development of patent law and
demonstrates why such clauses should be preempted.2' It also
discusses the economics behind patent law and explains why
financial policy leads to the conclusion that reverse engineering of
unpatented subject matter is economically sound.22 Finally, this
section reviews the potential for harm associated with allowing the
prohibition of reverse engineering by focusing on the likelihood of
other industries adopting similar protective licenses.23 Ultimately,
this Note concludes that the current state of patent law demands
that courts invalidate reverse-engineering clauses within shrink-
wrap licenses.
BACKGROUND ANI) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT LAW
The protection of creative ideas has been an important part of the
world's development stemming from ancient times.24 In the Middle
Ages, merchant guilds were granted exclusive rights within specific
16. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
18. See infra notes 66-103 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 136-58 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
24. One ofthe earliest mentions ofpatents is that of a Greek historian named Phylarchos
from the third century B.C., who wrote about patents for cuisine in the city of Sybaris. 1
LIPSCOiB, supra note 9, § 1:1, at 7.
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towns or trades, leading to the formation of similar guilds among
craftsmen.' This initial foray into exclusivity spawned the
development of common law monopolies in England during the
fifteenth century, many of which were abolished by Queen
Elizabeth in the early seventeenth century.26 The remaining
monopolies became subject to the common law of England and were
finally abolished by act of Parliament in 1623 with the passing of
the Statute of Monopolies.2 ' Importantly, this statute expressly
reserved an exception for "any letters-patent and grants of privilege
for the term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the
sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures."' Part
of the theory surrounding this exception revolves around the belief
that inventions are a special form of property, and that the efforts
of inventors should rightfully be rewarded in exchange for the
public dissemination of their knowledge.'
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution realized the value of
patents to such an extent that they included a specific provision
granting Congress the regulatory power over patents.30 The origins
25. Id. at5-7. Eventually, thesecraftguildsformedintopowerfulcommercialenterprises,
the most famous ofwhich is probably the Hanseatic League of Northern Germany during the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
26. Id. § 1:2, at 13.
27. Id. § 1:5, at 29 (citing 21 Jac 1, Ch. 3. This statute abolished all existing monopolies
and barred the crown from making future grants).
28. Id. at 31 (quoting 21 Jac 1, Ch. 3, VI).
29. Id. § 1:5, at 33-34. This reward theory leads to the justification for granting the
exclusive right in the first place, as opposed to the belief that patents are just monopolies.
Many courts have weighed in on the value of inventors and their inventions to society as a
whole. E.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (identifying patent grants as the
encouragement of individual creative effort that is the best way to advance the public
welfare); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568 (1877) (recognizing the principle behind patents
as well-settled and useful); Kendall v. Windsor, 62 U.S. 322 (1859) (noting the bargain of
trading the exclusive right in exchange for public disclosure); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 F. 845, 870 (4th Cir. 1901) ("The protection and hope of profit
held out by our patent laws, inspires that stimulating energy which leads to experiment,
invention, and all the resulting benefits."); Brislin v. Carnegie Steel Co., 118 F. 579, 589
(W.D. Pa. 1902) ("While the motive and reward of the inventor is a monetary one, his work,
measured by beneficent results, may arise to the dignity of the humane."); Westinghouse Air
Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., 85 F. 786, 794 (N.D. Ill. 1898) ("The magnificent
flower of civilization, everywhere surrounding us, has opened from germs that were fructified
from the brains of our inventors.").
30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
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of the Clause have been alternatively attributed to James Madison
and Charles Pinckney.31 Both of these Framers submitted
provisions for copyright and patent as separate clauses, which were
considered by the Committee of Detail on September 5, 1787,
combined into the existing Clause, and adopted that same day.32
There are no records concerning any debate within this committee,
and the legislative history and purpose are similarly sparse. It
appears that this Clause involved very little controversy within the
convention.33 The only available mention of the Clause is a
paragraph that was written by James Madison in The Federalist
No. 43:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy
right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain,
to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions
seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). It is interesting to note
that the structure of this Clause refers to patents as useful arts, while copyrights are
referred to as science. At the time, the term "science" was broadly defined to mean
knowledge, and the term art was less associated with the fine arts. When referring to the
structure of the Clause it becomes apparent that "science," "authors," and "writings" must
refer to copyrights, while "useful arts," "inventors," and "discoveries" must refer to patents.
For a detailed and comprehensive discussion of this interpretation of the Clause, see 1
LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:1, at 73-82. This distinction is important when viewed from the
standpoint ofmoder definitions of the terms "science" and"art," especially when considering
the modem association of science with patents.
31. James Madison was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Virginia, wrote
many of the Federalist papers in support of the new Constitution, and was the fourth
president. Charles Pinckney was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from South
Carolina, who had been a member of the Inns of Court in England, had been called to the
English Bar, and was familiar with the English law of patents. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, §
2:1, at 71-72.
32. The provisions that Pinckney contributed were: "To grant patents for useful
inventions," and "To secure to authors exclusive rights for a certain time." Id. § 2:1, at 71.
Madison's provisions read: "To encourage by premiums and provisions, the advance of useful
knowledge and discoveries," and" To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a limited
time." Id. § 2:1, at 72. Originally Madison and Pinckney wanted to include outright
government subsidies for new inventions, but this was rejected in favor of exclusive rights.
MERGES, supra note 9, at 8.
33. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, John Fitch was conducting a test of his
steamboat on the Delaware River. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:1, at 72. Reportedly, the
convention adjourned on August 23, 1787 to witness the successful trial and some of the
members actually rode on the boat. Id. Commentators have suggested that this powerful
demonstration helped to persuade the members of the importance ofpatent protection at the
federal level. Id.
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good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separatelymake effectual provision for either
of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of
this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.'
The lack of treatment suggests that the issue of granting the power
over patent regulation to the federal government was not
controversial.
Prior to the development of the Constitution, the states granted
patents that were valid only within that specific state. As a result,
it became necessary to seek patents from each state. For example,
John Fitch received steamboat patents from New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Delaware, while James Rumsey obtained a
steamboat patent in Maryland and contested Fitch's patents in New
York and Pennsylvania. 5
The first Congress passed the first patent statute in the early
days of its second session. 6 The first patent was subsequently
issued to Samuel Hopkins for a process for making potash from
wood ashes. 7 The original system called for the Secretaries of State
and War and the Attorney General to examine the invention's
usefulness and importance.3 " This system proved to be unworkable
because of the press of other important duties on these key
officials. 9 As a result, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1793,
34. THE FEDERAISTNO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961).
35. 1 LIPSCOMB,supra note 9, § 1:7, at53. Infurtherdevelopment ofthe steamboatissue,
the value of a local state patent was demonstrated to be much less if the boats were used in
interstate commerce. Specifically, in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court, under Chief
Justice Marshall, held that a New York decree enjoining appellant from navigating the
waters of the state of New York was erroneous. Gibbons v. Ogdon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824). Though the decision was based on the Commerce Clause in the Constitution, it was
easy to see that local patents would be valueless when the invention was used in interstate
commerce. This result confirmed the need for a federal patent system.
36. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
37. MERGES, supra note 9, at 9. Potash, or potassim carbonate, was valuable for use in
making glass and soap. Columbia University, Potassium Carbonate, in TIE COLUB IA
ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2000), available at http'//lycos.infoplease.com/ce6/scil
A0839888.html.
38. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. at 109-10. At the time, Thomas Jefferson was the
Secretary of State. Because of his interest in invention and technology, he assumed the
burden of examining the petitions.
39. In fact, during the three-year period that this system was used, only fifty-seven
patents were issued. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:2, at 92.
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changing the system to essentially a registration system with no
true utility examination. 4' The lack of examination resulted in
extensive litigation in the courts.4 This led to passage of the Patent
Act of 1836,42 which reinstated the use of an examination scheme
and created the Patent Office, which was to be headed by a
commissioner appointed by the President and approved by the
Senate." Various amendments to this Act occurred throughout the
nineteenth century as the Patent Office developed its bureaucracy.
Those amendments were consolidated in the 1870s and remained
the governing patent law until substantial revision in 1952."
The fact that the governing Act was largely unchanged for so
long, however, does not mean that the last century has lacked
notable-and continual-change in the field of patents. The patent
system faced substantial challenges in the 1920s and 1930s as a
result of antitrust sentiment existing at the time.' These
challenges were overcome by the need for new technologies as part
of the World War H effort.46 Despite this need, antipatent sentiment
as associated with big business persisted into the early 1970s.47 In
the early 1980s, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement
Act,48 establishing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC), to hear all appeals from the federal circuits involving
patents.49 The creation of the CAFC resulted in enhanced stature
for the patent system and has increased the likelihood of patents
being held valid.5"
Since the 1980s, patent law and the value associated with
intellectual property have received increased national and
international attention.5 In part, this increased attention was
derived from recognition of the economic growth potential
40. Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 318, 321. See 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:2, at 93.
41. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:2, at 94.
42. Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117.
43. Id. at 117-18.
44. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 2:2, at 95.
45. MERGES, supra note 9, at 11.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
49. M RGES, supra note 9, at 12.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 12-13.
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associated with emerging technologies and the potential for the use
of intellectual property rights as instruments of economic policy. 2
As a result, harmonization of world patent law became an
important goal. An affiliate of the United Nations known as the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) championed this
effort."3 Many perceived WIPO as having a distinctly anti-Western
bias.5' Because of this perceived bias and the slow progress of the
WIPO, an alternative arena for promoting harmonization was found
in the Uruguay Round of negotiations on GATT."5 In addition to
creating the WTO, the Uruguay Round negotiated major
international changes to harmonize intellectual property law.56
These negotiations and changes are known as TRIPS.57 The most
important changes to U.S. patent law arising from these
negotiations are: a change to the length of the patent term from
seventeen years after issuance to twenty years after filing;
allowance of foreign pre-U.S. patent filing activities to be considered
for the purposes of establishing priority of invention in the United
States; and establishment of a new procedure for filing provisional
applications in the United States."
Currently, in order to receive a U.S. patent, an application must
be filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that
meets the requirements of the latest iteration of the Patent Act.59
In a simplified form, this Act requires a demonstration that the
matter in the application is patentable subject matter, has utility,
52. Id.
53. Id. at 39.
54. Id
55. GATT is a multilateral international trade agreement establishing international
rules to regulate international trade. It was originally negotiated in 1947 with the goal of
"liberaliz[ing] and mak[ing] secure the terms ofworld trade." International ContractAdviser,
A History of GATT and the Structure of the WTO, 2 L.J. EXTRA at 1 (1996) (on file with
William and Mary Law Review). Since 1947, this agreement has been renegotiated seven
different times, the last of which occurred from 1986-1994, and was called the Uruguay
Round after the country from which the round was first proposed. This latest agreement is
enforced through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and regulates almost everything
involved in international trade, from tariffs to labor and employment issues. Id. at 1-9.
56. See id.
57. See id
58. See MERGES, supra note 9, at 41.
59. The Act is Title 35 of the United States Code. 35 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp. W 1999).
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is novel, and is nonobvious.6" In exchange for the twenty-year post-
filing right to exclude, the patent application is published and the
information is disseminated to the public at large. The rationale
behind this process is that by making the information public, the
patentee has contributed to society.6 This public release allows
other inventors to build upon the original inventor's work and
promotes "the Progress of ... [the] useful Arts" mandated by the
Constitution.62 Basically, the inventor gives his invention to the
public in exchange for a right to exclude others from producing,
using, or selling his invention for a limited time.' This private
incentive helps to drive the innovative spirit of the nation and
promotes economic growth and development.64 This benefit is
important because the disclosure of the information provides ideas
and information to other inventors, who, in turn, can build on the
initial invention and create additional intellectual and technological
growth. It is this fact, in part, that Congress relies upon to establish
the balance between the length of the patent term and the
avoidance of outright monopolies.65
60. These requirements are delineated in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
The case law interpreting these requirements is extensive and beyond the scope of this Note.
61. See 1 LIPSCOMB,supra note 9, § 1:5, at 33-34. The idea of a contribution to societyhas
received a significant amount of discussion, especially with respect to the difference between
patent law and monopolies. See id. § 1:6, at 34-49. Inventors and their contributions to
societyhave been almost uniformly respected. Francis Bacon provided an excellent summary
of this sentiment in the preface to his Treatise on Interpreting Nature:
Now among all the benefits that could be conferred upon mankind, I discovered
none so great as the discovery of new arts for the bettering of human life. For
I saw that among the rude people of early times, inventors and discoverers were
reckoned as gods. It was seen that the works of founders of States, lawgivers,
tyrant-destroyers and heroes cover but narrow spaces, and endure but for a
time; while the work of the inventor, though of less pomp, is felt everywhere,
and lasts forever.
Francis Bacon, Preface to Treatise on Interpreting Nature, quoted in 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note
9, at 48.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
63. 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 1:6, at 35.
64. For a more thorough analysis of the effect of a patent system on economic growth, a
good source is the National Bureau of Economic Research website, located at http://www.
nber.org (last visited Nov. 15,2001). This website provides a large number of working papers
in .pdf format discussing the economics of intellectual property law. Many of these papers
conclude that strong property rights actually promote economic growth. This economic
growth is addressed in more detail infra, notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
65. See generally 1 LIPSCOMB, supra note 9, § 1:7 (discussing the difference between a
patent and a monopoly and the nature of patents as a contract for a limited time between the
828
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PREEMPTION
The doctrine of federal preemption of state law arose out of the
Constitutional Convention, within the text of the Supremacy
Clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
The first landmark case involving preemption doctrine was Gibbons
v. Ogden."7 In this case, Chief Justice Marshall delineated the
preemption doctrine:
Since ... the States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of
which depends on their interfering with ... an act of Congress
passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter
upon the inquiry whether ... [New York state laws] have, in
their application to this case, come into collision with an'act of
Congress ... Should this collision exist... the acts of New York
must yield to the law of Congress.6
Thus, in matters involving direct conflict between state and federal
authority, federal law is deemed supreme. This decision, however,
inventor and the government).
66. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This clause was mainly the product ofproposals crafted by
James Madison, introduced early in the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention.
KENNETH STARR ETAL, THE LAW OF PREEmON 5 (1991). Madison's goal was to introduce
an even stronger clause that granted the power "to negative all laws which to [national
legislators] shall appear improper.- Id at 7 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 162 (records of June 8, 1787XM. Farrand rev. ed., 1966)).
Proponents of the Small State, orNew Jersey Plan, rejected this stronger clause due to their
mistrust ofsuch a strong federal government. Id at 7-8. Inparticular, George Mason stated-
"[Tihe Danger is that the national [legislature] will swallow up the State Legislatures." Id.
at 6 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 160 (records of June
7,1787)). Madison and his supporters worried that the Small State Plan would not prevent
the states from interfering with one another. Id. at 8.
67. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
68. I& at 209-10.
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did not end the inquiry. Subsequent Courts upheld state laws that
did not directly conflict with existing federal law. 9 In fact, after the
Marshall Court, the Supreme Court upheld state power where it
was not in direct collision with federal statutes. 0
Methods of Determining Intent
In making decisions concerning preemption, the courts
necessarily engage in an inquiry to determine the intent of
Congress in passing a specific act worded in a specific way.7 1 This
intent is the key to determining whether an act is preemptive
because many of the powers of Congress are shared concurrently
with the states. 2 This sharing of power, when coupled with the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, makes it necessary to
determine that Congress intended to preempt state law in order for
the law to be so preempted.
Generally, courts use two methods to determine the intent of
Congress with regard to preemption." The first of these is express
69. Specifically such cases involved state law which did not conflict with an express
statute, but rather, infringed on congressional authority. For example, in Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, the Court upheld a pilotage requirement of Philadelphia for ships operating in
interstate and foreign commerce, and stated "the mere grant of... power to Congress, did
not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power; ... it is not the mere
existence of such a power, but its exercise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the
exercise of the same power by the States." Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12. How.)
299, 319 (1851). This is a rejection of Marshall's use of the dormant Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 209-210 (1824), and Justice Story's strong dissent
in Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 158-159 (1837), which criticized the
majority's upholding of a required reporting scheme imposed on the masters of vessels
entering New York from another country or another state as contrary to Congress's
"complete exercise of its power over the whole subject, as well in what is omitted as in what
is provided for." Id at 159 (Story, J., dissenting). In modem language, this is an expression
of the "occupation of the field" doctrine, in which Congress, by exercising a comprehensive
power, excludes the states from entering the arena. See STARRETAL., supra note 66, at 19.
70. E.g., Cooley, 53 U.S. 299; The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Miln, 36
U.S. 102; Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (state
corporation law potentially conflicting with Federal Maritime Law).
71. See STARR ET AL., supra note 66, at 14; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-28 to 6-31, at 1172-1212 (3d ed. 2000)(discussing the methods
courts use to determine preemption).
72. See also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (discussing how trade
secret law and patent law exist concurrently).
73. See STARR ET AL., supra note 66, at 14.
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preemption-a direct expression of preemptive effect by Congress
in the statute in question.7' The second method involves the implied
preemption doctrine. 5 This doctrine uses one of two tests to
determine legislative intent: the occupation of the field test, or the
obstacle test.76
Express Preemption
Express preemption applies in cases of direct collision between
state and federal law, as identified in Gibbons v. Ogden.77 This
doctrine can involve either a direct expression of congressional
intent to preempt state law within the statute itself, or clear
evidence of legislative intent to preempt state law.7s
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an example of express
preemption in a statute:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field
in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on
the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or
any provision thereof.79
It is interesting to note that although such a provision asserts
federal supremacy with regard to direct conflicts with state law,
this clause deliberately clarifies congressional intent to preempt
only direct conflicts through the use of the "occupying the field"
language. This type of clause is common to many statutes in which
Congress intends to preempt only direct conflict.80 Total federal
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 19, 27.
77. 22 U.S. (9 wheat.) 1 (1824); see STARR ETAL., supra note 66, at 19.
78. See STARR ETAL., supra note 66, at 15.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1994) (emphasis added). This "occupy
the field" language expresses Congress's intent to not preempt through the use of implied
preemption doctrine. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra notes 83-95 and
accompanying text.
80. E.g., Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-781, 76 Stat. 793
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1994)); Gun ControlActof 1968,18 U.S.C. § 927 (Supp. IV 1968);
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preemption also occurs expressly, and these types of clauses
generally appear in any of ten specific forms depending on the
mandate and type of regulation.8' Each of these types of direct
preemption involve an initial assertion of federal authority over the
issue at hand. Some of these types then grant limited authority to
the states or require the states to act in some fashion. 2
Implied Preemption
The courts have recognized two types of preemption that are
implied rather than direct.8" These two approaches are the
"occupying the field" test and the "obstacle" test. Each has been
criticized rather extensively."
The occupying the field test involves a determination of con-
gressional intent to exclude all other regulation within a specific
area of law. Professor Tribe has described the test aptly:
Even where state regulation is found not to conflict in its actual
operation with the substantive policies underlying federal
legislation, the state regulation can survive judicial scrutiny
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. § 667 (1994); Federal Railroad Safety
Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
81. These forms may be summarized as:
(1) No need for state and/or local assistance,
(2) No state economic regulation allowed,
(3) State and local assistance needed,
(4) State activities exception,
(5) Limited regulatory turnbacks,
(6) Federal mandating of state law enactment,
(7) Federal promotion of interstate compact formation,
(8) Gubernatorial petition for preemption removal,
(9) State veto of a federal administrative decision, and
(10) Contingent total preemption.
See U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS No. A-121, FEDERAL
STATUTORYPREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCALAUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND ISSUES
18 (1992)[hereinafter PREEMPTION].
82. Id.
83. These two types of preemption involve courtroom determinations of congressional
intent of the statute in question from the available record.
84. See, e.g., STARR ETAL., supra note 66, at 34-39; see also PREEMPTION, supra note 81,
at 40-41 (discussing seven concerns with preemption doctrine and its increased use); JOSEPH
F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION 107-125 (1991) (concluding
that the lack of precise implied preemption criteria has led to increased litigation).
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under the Supremacy Clause and whatever constitutional
provision supports the federal statute in question only if
Congress did not exercise its jurisdictional veto. For if Congress
has validly decided to "occupy the field" for the federal
government, state and local regulations within that field must
be invalidated no matter how well they comport with
substantive federal policies.85
Under this type of preemption, courts use two factors to determine
if a jurisdictional veto has occurred in a given case: 1) whether
Congress has so pervasively regulated in the field as to leave no
room for local regulation, and 2) whether "the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion." 6
The Supreme Court has been hesitant to find preemption absent
persuasive reasons, but the more comprehensive the legislative
regulation in a particular field, the more likely it is that the Court
will find such preemption."A frequently cited case for pervasive
regulation of a field resulting in preemption is Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.8" In Rice; the Court held that states could not
regulate grain warehouses that were federally licensed.89 The Court
stated: "Congress did more than make the Federal Act paramount
over state law in the event of conflict. It remedied the difficulties
which had been encountered in the Act's administration by
terminating the dual system of regulation."90 The Court thus looked
to the legislative history of the Act to determine Congress's
preemptive intent.
In legal areas that can only be deemed national in interest, courts
have been more willing to prevent state infringement on subject
matter that has traditionally been left to Congress to regulate.
91
The leading case involving exclusive federal interest preemption
is Hines v. Davidowitz,9" in which the Court invalidated a
Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens to register with state
85. 1 TRIBE, supra note 71, at 1204-05.
86. Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
87. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 71, at 1205.
88. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
89. Id. at 236.
90. Id. at 234.
91. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 71, at 1210.
92. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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authorities.9" Specifically, the Court concluded that the regulation
of aliens is part of the responsibility of the national government and
"where [the national government] acts, and the state also acts on
the same subject, 'the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme;
and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers
not controverted, must yield to it."'94 This type of preemption has
not been consistently applied and reflects differences in opinion as
to the scope of exclusive federal power.95
The obstacle test also arose from Hines, when the Court indicated
that state law is preempted if it were found to stand "as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."9" In other words, this type of preemption
arises when the state law conflicts with a specific congressional
goal. The Court later used the Hines analysis with respect to the
Clean Water Act when it found that a state nuisance action filed by
Vermont citizens was preempted by the Act's provisions limiting
state regulatory power over water pollution within its borders.9
The Court stated that to allow the suit to go forward would let the
states "do indirectly what they could not do directly-regulate the
conduct of out-of-state sources."" In short, because Congress had
limited a state's role in the promulgation of standards against
pollution, states were not permitted to attempt to circumvent this
limitation through the use of alternative state law remedies. 99
Similarly, in Felder v. Casey,1 °0 the Court determined that a
Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute creating notice requirements in
93. Id. at 66.
94. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)). Other relevant
national interests that have been protected include: migratory bird protection in North
Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983); regulation of aliens within U.S. borders in Toll
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); regulation of Native-American tribal affairs in Ramah Navajo
School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); and regulation of labor
management relations in both Sears, Roebuck & Co. u. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978), and
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
95. See STARR ET AL., supra note 66, at 26-27.
96. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.
97. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-97 (1987).
98. Id. at 495.
99. In International Paper, the state was attempting to regulate pollution that occurred
in a different state, but had an in-state effect. The Clean Water Act limited state power in
such instances to an advisory role, and the Vermont citizens attempted to bypass this
limitation using state nuisance law. Id. at 481.
100. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
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section 1983 l10 actions against state officials was preempted by
federal civil rights laws. The preemption test used was stated to be:
"[I]s the application of the State's notice-of-claim provision to §
1983 actions brought in state courts consistent with the goals
of federal civil rights laws, or does [it] 'stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes ... of
Congress?" °2 This determination of preemption provoked a strong
dissent from Justice O'Connor, who noted the existence of suchlaws
in almost forty states at the time and found the vague allusion to
the aims of the federal civil rights laws as an inadequate substitute
for a clear congressional indication of intent to preempt.
0 3
Preemption in the Intellectual Property Field
Within the field of patent law, preemption has not received
tremendous attention or application. Current patent preemption
law began with two Supreme Court decisions from 1964 involving
conflict with state unfair competition laws.0 4 These decisions were
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.1o5 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.1 6 Both of these cases involved mechanical lighting
devices patented by the-plaintiff and copied by the defendant.'o The
lower court had found the patents invalid, but allowed plaintiffs to
obtain relief under a state unfair competition law.' 8 The Supreme
Court, using broad language, held that federal patent law
preempted the state law.0 9
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing for individual liability of
government actors in tort actions).
102. Casey, 487 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
103. See iL 487 U.S. at 157-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); STARRTAL.,supra note 66, at
30.
104. Prior to 1964, there was little discussion of patent law and preemption. The Supreme
Court decided the two landmark cases together on the same day in 1964 and the current law
has developed from that baseline.
105. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
106. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
107. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234; Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26.
108. Compco, 376 U.S. at 235-36; Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.
109. In both of these cases, the Court broadly discouraged the attempted use of state law
to protect something that had been found to be not protectable under federal law. In Sears,
for example, the Court stated: "An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent
has expired, is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."
Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. The Court continued its discussion, concluding: "To allow a State by
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In 1973 the Court took a step back from the broad language of
Sears and Compco with its decision in Goldstein v. California. 110 In
that case, the state of California had established a penal statute
outlawing tape piracy."' This law was not preempted because
Congress had left the area of musical recordings "unattended" with
regard to the copyright laws, and so states were free to regulate in
this area."' Goldstein thus established that not all regulation in the
area of copyright (and by analogy patent) law by states is barred. In
fact, Goldstein has been understood to stand for the premise that
state regulation is permissible absent a congressional intent to
occupy the field."'
Subsequent development of Supreme Court patent law
preemption doctrine occurred in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp."4
In Kewanee, the Court upheld Ohio trade secret law protection.
The Court concluded that the state law did not conflict with the
purposes of the federal patent law and therefore was not pre-
empted. The reasoning behind this rationale was similar to that in
Goldstein. The Court found that states could protect matter that
was unpatentable and not in the public domain."'
use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an [unpatentable] article ...
would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which federal law has
said belongs to the public." Id. at 231-32.
110. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Though this case is a copyright case rather than a patent case,
courts have consistently used similar doctrine in interpreting these two areas of the law
because of the substantial similarity of the subject matter. That is not to say that they are
the same. For the purposes of preemption, however, this case is still important to patent law
because it indicates a small retreat by the Court from the broad preemption language of
Sears and Compco, and thus a higher standard for finding preemption of state law in any
given case.
111. Id. at 548.
112. Id. at 563-71. Prior to 1971, Congress had not included music recordings on the list
of protectable subject matter in federal copyright law. Its failure to do so was not seen as a
deliberate exclusion by the Court, and was found to be an omission without prejudice. Id. at
571.
113. See Synercom Tech., Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37,41 (N.D. Tex.
1979). But see Crow v. Wainright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
Congress officially occupied the field in 1976 by passing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) in response to
Goldstein).
114. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
115. The Court noted that some discoveries that are not patentable may be protected as
long as they are kept secret. Id. at 484-91. Trade secret law was seen to promote this
approach, and to prevent hoarding of knowledge. The Court also evaluated the economics
behind allowing trade secret law and found the economics supported such laws. Id. The
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Finally, in 1979 the Court took an additional step in narrowing
the scope of preemption by rejecting a federal preemption challenge
to a contract inAronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co."6 Specifically, the
Court stated: "Commercial agreements traditionally are the domain
of state law. State law is not displaced merely because the contract
relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable;
the states are free to regulate the use of such intellectual property
in any manner not inconsistent with federal law.""7 This result
provided solid support for the proposition that states could operate
within the realm of intellectual property as long as their laws were
not contrary to federal patent or copyright law.
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed the trend of weakening
preemption doctrine with regard to patent law in Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc."8 In Bonito Boats, the Court
invalidated a Florida statute prohibiting the use of a molding
process to duplicate unpatentable boat hull designs because the
statute conflicted with federal patent law." 9 The Court concluded
that the Florida statute was an effort to give patent-like protection
to subject matter that was not protectable under federal law. 2 0
Because boat hull information was available to the public at large,
Florida could not remove it from the public domain by way of state
law. 2 The Court also recognized the right to reverse engineer
products in the public domain when it said:
[Tihe Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a
form of reverse engineering of a product in the public domain.
This is clearly one of the rights vested in the federal patent
holder, but has never been a part of state protection under the
law of unfair competition or trade secrets.22
Court, however, was careful to note that trade secret law could not prevent the discovery of
the trade secret by fair and honest means such as independent creation or reverse
engineering. Id. at 490. Despite this finding, Kewanee seemed to be an additional retreat by
the Court from the reach of federal law as interpreted in Sears and Compco.
116. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
117. Id. at 262 (emphasis added).
118. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
119. Id at 144.
120. Id. at 168.
121. Id. at 158-60.
122. Md at 160.
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To date, there have been no court cases dealing directly with
preemption of shrink-wrap licenses by patent law. There are,
however, two cases of note that involve preemption of shrink-wrap
licenses by copyright law. These cases, from the Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits,2 will be discussed in detail in
the next section.
THREE REASONS PATENT LAW SHOULD PREEMPT SHRINK-WRAP
LICENSES
There are three reasons patent law should preempt reverse-
engineering prohibition clauses in shrink-wrap licenses. First, such
clauses conflict with the policies underlying patent law. The rapid
advance of software technology outpaced initial efforts by the courts
and the USPTO to define patent availability for such
developments. 4 Considering the relative ease of decompiling
program codes, it is understandable that the computer industry
developed the shrink-wrap license to avoid piracy of trade secrets
through disassembly and reverse engineering of software. Despite
this reality, the clauses are in direct conflict with congressional
intent behind the Patent Act and judicial delineation of that intent.
Second, the clauses conflict with national economic policy which
reflects the value of increased competition fostered by the ability of
firms to reverse engineer and improve upon the products of
competitors. Finally, although shrink-wrap licenses have been used
primarily in the software industry in the past, if courts allow
reverse-engineering prohibition clauses to stand, other companies
in other industries will begin using these licenses to extend their
trade secret protection. This extension of trade secret protection
123. These two cases are ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
124. In the early days of software development, the courts and the USPTO struggled with
defining availability of patents for software. For example, in 1972 the Supreme Court held
that mathematical algorithms are not patentable. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Subsequent case history trying to define what should and should not be patentable became
muddled and uncertain. Currently, however, the availability of patents for software is
undisputed, though patents that claim mere algorithms probably remain invalid. For an
excellent discussion ofthe chaotic development of patent law for software, see MERGES,supra
note 9, at 66-139 (reviewing the movement from uniform denial of patentability to qualified
approval of software patents).
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will expand their limited intellectual property monopolies beyond
what was originally intended by the architects of the current patent
system.
Examples of Reverse-Engineering Prohibition Clauses
Before demonstrating that patent law preempts reverse-
engineering prohibition clauses contained in shrink-wrap licenses,
it may be useful to provide a few examples of such clauses. An
expansive example is found in clause two of a legal-software
agreement:
Restrictions: You may not, and you may not permit others to, (a)
disassemble, decompile or otherwise derive source code from the
Software, (b) reverse engineer the Software, (c) modify or
prepare derivative works ofthe Software, (d) copy the Software,
except as expressly permitted in this Agreement, (e) rent or
lease the Software, or (f) use the Software in any manner that
infringes the intellectual property or other rights of Emanuel or
another party.12
Aless expansive example is the second clause of another software
agreement: "Limitations on Reverse Engineering, Decompilation,
and Disassembly. You may not reverse engineer, decompile, or
disassemble the SOFTWARE PRODUCT, except and only to the
extent that such activity is expressly permitted by applicable law
notwithstanding this limitation." 6 These clauses are a reasonable
representation of software shrink-wrap clauses that limit reverse
engineering.127 They are explicit in denying end users the right to
125. EMANUEL PUBLISHING CORP., LAW IN A FLASH INTERACTIVE SoFTwARE END-USER
LICENSE AGREEMENT (1999).
126. MICROSOFT CoRp., MICROSOFT OFFICE 2000 STANDARD AE LICENSES:1, END-USER
LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR MICROSOFT SOFTWARE (1999).
127. In comparing the two similar clauses, a difference that stands out is the attempt in
the Microsoft clause to limit the effect of future legal challenges. For example, if courts were
to find that actions prohibited by the Microsoft clause were in fact permitted, then the clause
would still be valid subject to such a limitation. This might not he true of the Emanuel
clause, which provides such flexibility only in the context of copying. The Microsoft shrink-
wrap license, or End User License Agreement (EULA), limits copying in a different clause
that does not contain the flexibility of the reverse-engineering clause, but rather, limits use
essentially to the extent the courts have uniformly decided is permissible with respect to
A A
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reverse engineer the product.
Congressional policy behind patent law indicates that such
clauses should be unenforceable because federal patent law
preempts them. The traditional enforcement mechanism for license
agreements has been state contract law." In ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg,29 the Seventh Circuit upheld the validity of a shrink-
wrap contract despite a challenge that federal copyright law
preempted the contract. In broad language, Judge Easterbrook
stated that rights created by contract are not "'equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright."" Later,
the opinion recognized that although Congress has the power to
preempt the enforcement of contracts involving intellectual
property, courts usually leave private contracts unaffected by
preemption clauses.'' Judge Easterbrook then stated that the
copying. This flexibility reflects the industry's uncertainty regarding the enforceability of
reverse-engineering clauses.
128. It is important to remember that copyright law, like patent law, does not prevent
states from legislating in the field unless the state law directly conflicts with, or is impliedly
preempted by, the federal law. This field is shared because the Court found in Kewanee that
federal intellectual property law did not necessarilypreempt state trade secret law. Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 466 U.S. 470,479 (1974). There is, therefore, room within the field
for some state regulation.
129. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 1454 (quoting § 301(a) of the Copyright Act). In that case, the defendant
violated the ProCD license agreement by copying data stored on the ProCD software and
reselling it. Id. at 1450. The defendant argued in part that because the shrink-wrap contract
was inside the box and not visible, it was not enforceable because it was not part of the
purchase agreement. Id. at 1450-53. Judge Easterbrook rejected this argument. Id. at 1452-
53.
131. Id. at 1454. Others have also arguedinsupport of the notionthat copyright orpatent
law should not preempt private ordering contracts. E.g., Mark I. Koffsky, Note, Patent
Preemption of Computer Software Contracts Restricting Reverse Engineering: The Last
Stand?, 95 CoLUIA L. REV. 1160, 1174 (1995). The problem with a blanket presumption of
private contract validity is that these contracts will proliferate if courts deem reverse-
engineering prohibition clauses in shrink-wrap contracts invalid. That is, since a shrink-wrap
contract will not prevent reverse engineering, a signed agreement will be required for each
and every software sale. Though this sounds implausible, the potential is there through use
of the Internet, on-line ordering and single operator questions to indicate a form of
negotiation that would be sufficient to move each contract into the realm of private ordering.
In other words, every time software is bought, such a purchase would turn into a"negotiated"
private agreement. A more reasonable case for eliminating preemption in contracts would
involve truly independently negotiated contracts that include a reverse-engineering
prohibition clause. These contracts would not be a real issue because they are essentially the
same as licensing of a trade secret. Though Professor Rice emphasizes the importance of
protecting individually negotiated contracts, these contracts are not really an issue because
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shrink-wrap license is a private ordering contract that should be
respected and upheld as "essential to the efficient functioning of
markets." 2 This case has been the object of much controversy,"'
with notable criticism coming from Professor Nimmer:
Having run through the trio of cases that underlay both the
district and circuit courts' analysis in ProCD, it thus appears
that the rule safeguarding contract causes of action against
copyright pre-emption is less than categorical. Although the vast
majority of contract claims will presumably survive scrutiny-
as did each of the contract claims confronted in that trio
-nonetheless pre-emption should continue to strike down
claims that, though denominated "contract," nonetheless
complain directly about the reproduction of expressive
materials.34
As such, contract claims are seemingly open to preemption if they
conflict with federal law.3 5
they normally contain confidentiality clauses as well as other trade secret protection clauses
that do not run contrary to patent law. David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and
Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse
Engineering, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 543,622-26 (1992). Finally, such contracts are likely not a
large part of the software sales industry.
132. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455. This assertion actually reflects a "trees" rather than a
"forest" approach to the efficiency of the national economy. Because strong property rights
promote economic growth, it is arguable that intellectual property rights protection is more
valuable than the economic protection thatJudgeEasterbrookespousedhere. This difference
in value is the case because Judge Easterbrook asserted that such clauses serve the same
"procompetitive functions as does the law oftrade secrets," yet patent law is possibly a better
promoter of such functions because of the required disclosure to the public of the invention.
Id. at 1455.
133. For cases holdingbreach of contract actions are not preempted by the Copyright Act,
see National Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. ComputerAssociations Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th
Cir. 1993); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488 (5th Cir. 1990); Acorn
Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control
Systems, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see American Movie Classics Co. v.
Turner Entm't Co., 922 F. Supp. 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wolff v. Institute of Elec. & Elecs.
Eng'rs, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
134. 1 MELVILLE B. NlmMER & DAVID NnVhMER, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] [11 [h] at
1-22 (2000) (citations omitted).
135. Even Judge Easterbrook admits that there cannot be a per se rule against federal
preemption of contract law. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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Shrink-Wrap License Prohibitions on Reverse Engineering
Conflict with Patent Law Policy
The goals of strong intellectual property protection are fostering
creativity and innovation in society and rewarding inventors for
their achievements in exchange for public dissemination of the
novel invention.'86 It is easy to see how making technology public
fosters further growth and innovation. The hope of patent law is
that once the novel creation is made public, other inventors will be
inspired to build upon the initial creative leap.13 7 The twenty-year
right to exclude 3 ' is thus balanced by the value gained from public
disclosure of the invention. This function is served by the novelty
and nonobviousness requirements in the patent law." 9 These
standards require that the invention be a sufficient development in
technology before the right to exclude is given. 40 Additionally,
patent law ensures adequate public disclosure such that one
"skilled in the art" could create the invention without substantial
experimentation.' Developments that do not meet these high
standards, or are not protectable because they do not fall within the
subject matter of patent law, are denied protection.
Reverse-engineering prohibition clauses are an attempt to
prevent discovery of trade secrets through the use of state contract
law. As a result, such clauses conflict with federal patent law and
are preempted.142 These clauses directly conflict with the goals of
136. MERGES, supra note 9, at 7; see also supra notes 24-65 and accompanying text.
137. See MERGES, supra note 9, at 7.
138. This right to exclude means that for the duration of the patent, the patentee can
prevent anyone from making or using his invention. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1147 (7th ed.
1999). This right is the strongest intellectual property right available in U.S. law. For
example, copyright protects original expression within the appropriate subject matter, but
there are exceptions, such as fair use or independent creation, that permit others to use that
expression. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Similarly, trade secret law protects
against misappropriation of secret inventions (that may ormay notbe patentable) and allows
exploitation of those secrets by the inventor. Trade secret law, however, provides no
protection against valid discovery of the secret through techniques such as reverse
engineering. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1, in Pedowitz & Sikker, supra note 11.
139. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
140. See id.
141. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
142. Despite the conclusions of ProCD, courts have held contracts to be preempted by
patent law when they fail the preemption analysis delineated supra notes 66-123 and
accompanying text See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265 (1979)
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patent law by attempting to provide patent like rights to inventions
that, for whatever reason, are not patented.143 These patent-like
rights include the right to reverse engineer.'" By offering such
patent-like rights, these contracts also conflict with "strong federal
policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent
protection."'45
Shrink-wrap licenses also stand as an obstacle to a realization of
the full purposes of the patent law. Prohibition of reverse
engineering by these licenses obstructs patent law's ultimate goal
of disclosure. These clauses reduce the competition inherent in
technology development. In fact, in Bonito Boats, the Court
discussed the value of allowing reverse engineering: "[Tihe
competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the
inventor, creating an incentive to develop inventions that meet the
rigorous requirements of patentability.""6 To prevent reverse
engineering "reduces this competitive incentive, thus eroding the
general rule of free competition upon which the attractiveness of
the federal patent bargain depends." 147 Reverse engineering
provides a valuable mechanism of creative development, and to
deny that right damages the public contract provided by patent law.
(upholdinga contract afterperformingpreemption analysis and finding "[e lnforcement of this
royalty agreement is even less offensive to patent policies than state law protecting trade
secrets."). See generally Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (2000)
(holding, after conducting the preemption analysis, that a cause of action for breach of an
implied-in-fact contract is preempted by the Copyright Act); Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp.
2d 531 (1999) (holding that plaintiff's attempt to describe copyright case as merely a breach
ofcontract case was disingenuous at best, after completing anexhaustive review of both sides
of the ProCD argument); Endemol Entm't, B.V. v. Twentieth Television, Inc., No. CV 98-
0608, ABC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19049 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (holding that plaintiffs
breach of implied contract claim was preempted because it did not assert any additional
rights beyond copyright).
143. It is important to note that inventions protected by trade secret fall into three
categories: (1) those that are clearly not patentable, (2) those for which patentability is
unclear, and (3) those that are clearly patentable. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S 470, 482-91 (1973).
144. For a discussion of this right, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S.
141, 160 (1989); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 490.
145. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
146. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 160.
147. Id. at 161.
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The Economics of Patent Law Support Public Dissemination
In general, patent law exchanges public disclosure of inventions
for a grant of a limited right to exclude.148 Absent this public
disclosure, the value of technological advances to the public is
diminished. For this reason, patent protection is much stronger
than trade secret protection, and reverse engineering of trade
secrets is not only protected, but encouraged. As a result, attempts
to prevent trade secret discovery through proper means such as
reverse engineering run counter to the economic policy behind the
patent law.
Four general economic theories have been proposed concerning
the economic value of patent rights. 49 These theories have received
differing levels of treatment within the community, and may be
summarized as:
1. The anticipation of patents provides motivation for useful
invention.
2. Patents induce inventors to "disclose" their inventions when
otherwise they would rely on secrecy, and in this and other
ways facilitate wide knowledge about and use of inventions.
3. Patents on inventions induce the needed investments to
develop and commercialize them.
4. Patents enable the orderly exploration of broad prospects. 50
148. The benefit to society is dissemination to the public at large of the elements of the
invention in the hope that such dissemination will encourage additional development of the
technology in all fields to which it may apply. These additional developments could then
conceivably obtain patent protection and continue the cycle. In technology development, the
initial creative leap often provides the basis for development of completely new facets of
technology for decades to come. For example, the discovery of penicillin has created a
tremendous market for novel and stronger antibiotics. Oddly enough, the use of those
antibiotics seems to be perpetuating the need for additional development. See generally New
H.I.V. Strains ResistAIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,1993, at A18 (discussing that resistance
develops as drugs eliminate the susceptible strains of a bacteria and new infections arise that
do not respond to the drugs).
149. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and
Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031 (1998).
150. See id. at 1033. The authors debate each of the theories and point to holes in each in
the context of specific assumptions made by the authors. Due to problems within these
assumptions, lending credence to their discussion is difficult. For example, they assume that
a race to invent is mainly duplication and waste, but they fail to. address the fact that
competition can foster decreased public cost. Id. at 1036-37. The flaw of the assumption is
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The second theory referred to above directly conflicts with
attempts to prohibit reverse engineering of trade secrets. By
attempting to prevent disclosure of the trade secrets in an
invention, shrink-wrap licenses serve to stifle additional creative
development of these ideas. This prevention ultimately dampens
the potential for economic growth based upon the development by
others of novel ideas that build upon the trade secret. 51
An argument that supporters offer to justify prevention of reverse
engineering is that the balance struck by Congress is not viable for
software and thus software should be treated differently."3 2 This
argument, however, can be reversed. If patent protection is useless
for software because the value of software is so front loaded that the
twenty-year term is meaningless, then the time it takes to reverse
engineer and redevelop would also prove less valuable than the
head start offered by the initial product. Thus, to reverse engineer
such a product would be economically inefficient, and such reverse
engineering would not occur unless the reverse engineer had
that two companies racing to patent competing ideas would not both receive protection.
Though this may be the case occasionally, the author of this Note has observed that even
when pursuing competing ideas, the eventual inventions may both be patentable and thus
protectable. This idea can be expressed through the common wisdom that there is "more than
one way to skin a cat." Once both inventions reach the market, competition will further
benefit society by keeping the prices down. Though each company may not reap the profits
itwould have without competition, this is the balance struckby the length ofthe patent term
as determined by Congress.
151. The disclosure theory becomes increasingly valuable to society when one assumes
that the inventor cannot exploit all of the possible uses of the invention. Id. at 1039. Again,
the author's experience in the pharmaceutical industry reveals that this lack of ability to
exploit is often the case. The creative process often results in multiple uses for a technology
not considered or developed by the original inventor. This idea can lead to "buccaneering" of
inventions to find routes around competitors' intellectual property. It is legal to find routes
around the inventions of others as long as infringement is avoided. Again, assuming the
balance struck by Congress with regard to the patent term is met, this is economically
efficient. ("Buccaneering" is used to distinguish from bad faith connotations associated with
piracy. Buccaneers were legally sanctioned pirates. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 148 (10th ed. 1993)).
152. Peter S. Menell, Tayloring Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329,1347-51 (1987); Pamela Samuelson et al.,A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection
of Computer Programs 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2344-47 (1994). See generally Anthony J.
Mahajan, Note, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After ProCD: A
Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 3297, 3331-35 (1999)
(offering a compromise between absolute preemption and no preemption that would establish
a limited right to protection for a shorter period of time than a patent, based on the
purported economics of software development).
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enough value to add to the existing technology to make the work
cost effective.
Finally, the economic value of strong intellectual property rights
may most easily be viewed by looking at the impact of the TRIPs
agreement in developing countries. Though it is still early to make
any definitive conclusions, research into a cure for malaria has
increased since those countries affected by the disease introduced
strong intellectual property rights.15 Given that there is no
indication that the science has become any "easier," the conclusion
that intellectual property rights played a role is difficult to avoid. 154
Additionally, economists have asserted that "international trade in
ideas is a major factor in world growth." 5 These economists believe
that disclosure and protection help drive the global economy
because "the world is not far from one in which all [ countries tap
a common pool of knowledge, with a country's relative productivity
depending on its ability to absorb that knowledge into its domestic
technology."5 6 Establishing exclusive property rights serves the
dual purpose of protecting patentees and promoting the diffusion of
information and technology."5 7 Lack of patent rights, therefore,
would have a negative effect on encouraging competition and
technological innovation. 5 ' The value of a strong patent system
thus derives, in part, from the disclosure of information and the
development that such revelation fosters. As a result, attempts to
circumvent such a system by preventing valid discovery of
information should be discouraged.
153. Jean 0. Lanjouw & lain Cockburn, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence After
GAYT29 (January2000) (Working Paper 7495, on file with the National Bureau of Economic
Research), available at http'//www.nber.org/papers/w7495.pdf.
154. Id.
155. Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Productivity in the
OECD 1 (May 1997) (Working paper 5049, on file with the National Bureau of Economic
Research), available at http/www.nber.org/papersw5O49.
156. Id. at 23.
157. See id. at 2-3.
158. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, Firms, and the Market for
Technology: U.S. Manufacturing in the late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (April
1997) (Historical Paper 98, on file with the National Bureau of Economic Research), available
at httpJ/www.nber.orgpapers/H0098.
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Dangers of the Slippery Slope
A final consideration regarding the prohibitions against reverse
engineering in shrink-wrap licenses is the potential harm to the
intellectual development of the country that would result from
additional industry entry into the shrink-wrap license world.
Assuming arguendo that courts uphold shrink-wrap licenses and
that prohibitions against reverse engineering are enforceable, there
is reason to suspect that other industries will opt to use such
licenses to protect their inventions or innovations. The effect of such
clauses would be to extend intellectual property protection
indefinitely for inventions and to establish the potential for real
monopolies.
It is true that some inventions would eventually be duplicated by
other inventors, but shrink-wrap contracts could theoretically then
be modified to prevent this activity as well. For example, in addition
to prohibiting reverse engineering, a shrink-wrap contract could
include a clause stating, "by accepting this shrink-wrap license the
purchaser agrees not to pursue research or development in X field
or similar fields." Under ProCD, as long as the contract could be
deemed a private ordering contract, such a clause would be
enforceable.
Such a slippery slope would rapidly expand to include many
industries. Pharmaceutical companies would prevent disclosure of
their drug developments, beyond the fact that "X" tradename drug
works to prevent or cure "Y" health problem. Such companies have
already complained and fought the generic drug companies tooth
and nail because of the tremendous profits that they wish to
continue earning from their patents.159 Extending such monopoly-
like rights beyond the current patent length would result in
companies suppressing improvements to their existing products
159. See, e.g., Schering.Plough Political Money Pushes Claritin Patent Extension and
Distorts GAO Report: FDA was Justified in Delaying Approval for Claritin, PUB. CITIZEN,
Aug. 31,2000, available at http-/www.citizen.orglpress/pr-drugs26.htm; Columbia University
Patent Extension Would Cost Consumers, Open Floodgates for More Special Deals: Groups
Urge Senators toRemoveRiderAdded Secretly toAppropriations Bill, PUB. CITIZEN, May26,
2000, available at http'/www.citizen.org/press/pr-drugs20.htm; Lilly to Receive Six
Additional Months of Prozac Market Exclusivity, LILLY NEWSROOM, Nov. 15, 2000, at
httpJ/newsroom.lilly.com/news/story.cfm.
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until they have maximized their return from the old products or
another company independently invents the first products.160
Additionally, collaborative efforts between companies would
drastically decline. Companies would hoard their inventive ideas in
order to maximize the derivative products that they can make by
keeping the underlying technology secret. The possibilities are
endless. For example, imagine agreeing to a shrink-wrap clause
before buying a car, and then being gouged every time the oil needs
changing because it can be serviced only at the dealer to avoid
reverse-engineering problems.
It is true that the slippery slope analysis could be carried to the
absurd, and that market factors would probably play a role in
encouraging some competition, but those same market factors
would also encourage company agreements not to compete in
different fields. Additionally, the small business would become
nonexistent as it tried to exploit its intellectual property because
even if it sought patent protection, other companies would better
maximize their profits by extending their intellectual property
protection beyond the length of the patent period. This extension
requires political and financial resources unavailable to smaller
companies.' 6'
In order to avoid these problems, it is important to establish that
reverse engineering of publicly sold products is legal, despite any
shrink-wrap provisions. The policies of patent law and preemption
doctrines combine to invalidate shrink-wrap clauses restricting
reverse engineering.'62 Economic policy demands strong intellectual
property protection, yet fundamental to this protection is disclosure
of the information to the public in exchange for a limited monopoly-
like right.63 Shrink-wrap provisions that attempt to conceal valid
discovery of trade secrets thus should be nullified uniformly.
Otherwise, the slope will start to develop, inertia may take over,
and the results could be catastrophic.
160. Obviously, this assumes that there is no moral or ethical obligation associated with
the release of such compounds.
161. See Schering-Plough, supra note 159.
162. See supra notes 136-47 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The ban on reverse engineering contained in shrink-wrap licenses
is an attempt to extend trade secret protection of ideas beyond the
boundaries of patent law set by Congress and the courts. Such
clauses directly conflict with the policy and intent of Congress to
provide intellectual property protection in the form of patents and
are therefore preempted by federal patent laws. Furthermore,
national and international economic policy supports strong
intellectual property rights when coupled with disclosure of the
inventions. Given that reverse-engineering prohibitions attempt to
prevent such disclosure, they run counter to valid economic policy
and theory, creating another reason why such bans should not be
upheld. Finally, because of the potential impact of reverse-
engineering prohibitions in other industries above and beyond the
software-industry, such clauses should be aff atively rejected by
the legal system of the United States whenever enforcement is
sought.
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